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Mijnheer de Rector Magnificus, dames en heren, 
Mr. Rector, ladies and gentlemen, 
From farming knowledge 
You can take the boy out of the farm but you cannot take 
the farm out of the boy, to paraphrase an old saying. It cer-
tainly applies to me: after I grew up on a farm near Ommen 
in the eastern part of the Netherlands, I left for the big 
cities of Amsterdam, Florence, Brussels, Brighton and 
Rotterdam, to return last year to the area in between the 
Randstad and Germany, at Wageningen University & 
Research Centre (WU&R), previously known as the na-
tion's Agricultural University. Although on a part-time ba-
sis (one day a week) and twenty-five years too late, I find 
myself at a place where I should have started my academic 
career, at least that's what my dad secredy believes. In spite 
of the detour that my career has thus far been as far as my par-
ents are concerned, my professorship in innovative entrepre-
neurship at Wageningen University has made them happy. 
As far as they are concerned my achievements thus far are 
all very nice, but it was time the prodigal son came home. 
And so I did, even though it is still quite a drive from 
Wageningen to Ommen. 
When I told my dad, a retired dairy farmer, about the pro-
fessorial job I was asked to apply for almost two years ago, I 
asked him if he saw himself as an innovative entrepreneur. 
His answer was crystal clear: although of course he was the 
self-employed owner of a small business, he did not consid-
er himself an entrepreneur since he did not have a major 
drive for innovation and growth. He explained that he felt 
he had always worked under conditions that were relatively 
predictable: both demand and supply were stable, with fixed 
milk price and quota arrangements, and over the years only 
a small number of process and product innovations were in-
troduced to our farm. The biggest changes had probably 
been the shift from small scale mixed farming towards spe-
cialized dairy farming (i.e. dropping arable farming and pig 
forming), the purchase of milking machinery and the regu-
lar replacement of our John Deere tractor. Make no mistake, 
my dad was by no means a sloppy farmer. In fact in the lo-
cal village he was considered to be among the more innova-
tive farmers, and his increases in milk production were re-
markable. In his younger days, when Western Europe was 
rebuilding itself after the Second World War, he brought in-
novations to the attention of farmers and instructed them 
how to use new milking equipment. 
Probably without realizing it, my dad was engaged in 
knowledge transfer and agricultural extension, one of the 
key topics of this address, by facilitating the diffusion of new 
agricultural practices and technologies from the university 
and the agricultural experiment stations to his fellow farm-
ers through education and training. Thus, he embodied the 
principles of the Dutch agricultural innovation system, 
which has been successful in modernizing the nations hor-
ticulture and farming methods. In a way, he symbolized the 
achievements of the Dutch agriculture and agri-food sectors 
in the post-World War II period: the large-scale production 
of low-innovative and competitive goods (commodities) and 
the effective sale of bulk products all over the world, backed 
by a national knowledge infrastructure and an excellent lo-
gistics and distribution system with effective supply chains 
connecting suppliers and customers globally (Peper, 1996). 
The best example of this successful practice is probably the 
thriving cut flower industry in the West of the Netherlands, 
with one cluster located around Aalsmeer (close to Schiphol 
Amsterdam International Airport) and another around 
Naaldwijk (the Wesdand area, close to the Rotterdam har-
bour). In fact, it is so remarkable that even an economist like 
Michael Porter (1990: 85) mentioned it in his quest for the 
origins of the competitiveness of nations, and dedicated half 
a page to it. What Porter probably did not realize is that these 
wonderful Dutch tulips did not originate in Amsterdam or 
the Amsterdam-Haarlem-Leiden (AHL) triangle (with de 
Keukenhof Lisse as its main tourist hot spot and Aalsmeer as 
its commercial centre), nor in the Wesdand (the Rotterdam-
The Hague-Hook of Holland triangle), but in Wageningen 
(and, for those among you who enjoy a bit of history, before 
that in Turkey!).1 Despite certain disadvantages (e.g. a grey 
and rainy climate), the Dutch cut flower cluster, with its re-
search hub in Wageningen and entrepreneurial firms pre-
dominandy located in the AHL and the Wesdand triangles, 
has managed to carry out a number of process and product 
innovations, ranging from new glasshouse growing and cul-
tivation techniques and new strains of flowers, to improved 
energy conservation methods. 
Furthermore, the flower cluster is continuously being up-
graded to seize new opportunities and adapt to shifts in 
global demand. The sustainable competitive advantage of 
the Dutch flower industry was initially built on a set of mu-
tually reinforcing mechanisms, such as domestic rivalry 
among growers and local auction houses, supported by a 
strong domestic demand for flowers throughout the year, 
dedicated flower cultivation research and testing organiza-
tions, and an abundant supply of cheap natural gas for the 
glasshouses. Although in terms of quality improvement, 
process innovations (through mechanisation and automa-
tion, and streamlining production as well as distribution), 
and overall cost savings, the achievements have been re-
markable, there is a continuous threat that a large portion 
of the total Dutch horticultural production may be relocat-
ed to Southern Europe (for instance Spain and Portugal) if 
energy consumption per product is too high (Pannekoek, 
van Kooten, Kemp & Omta, 2005). Because of this, there 
is an urge, or better a need, to cut back systematically on 
energy consumption and to introduce innovations and al-
ternative concepts like the closed and intelligent 
Greenhouse system. After an effective international mar-
keting campaign and subsequent exporting successes, the 
Dutch flower production system became more heteroge-
neous, and when home-based suppliers of glasshouses and 
other specialized knowledge institutes like the Sprenger 
Institute and the Aalsmeer experiment station (e.g. for 
packaging and shipping know-how) became further in-
volved and a highly efficient flower-handling and air freight 
infrastructure was put in place, the dynamic cluster entered 
the stage of high-tech engineering. 
This personal introduction contains all the key elements of 
my inaugural address, namely: 
- entrepreneurship, which can be described as the pursuit 
of opportunities and the realization of innovations, and 
eventually the creation of new organizations; 
- networking and clustering, which at the local or micro-level 
refer to the search and partner strategies of entrepreneurs, and 
at the intermediate and macro-levels to the efforts of public 
research organizations, small and large firms, and local/re-
gional governments working together to bring about growth; 
- technology and knowledge transfer, which refers to the 
flows of technical and commercial information between 
universities, dedicated research establishments, industry 
and small businesses, and the way these processes are co-
ordinated; 
- the Wageningen University and Food Valley setting, the 
research cluster that has been built around the university 
and its extension services, strongly embedded in the na-
tion's agricultural and agri-food sectors; 
- knowledge farming, referring to the venturing into the 
unknown through the continuous (re-)use and cultiva-
tion of knowledge. This is the new concept covering a 
growing number of activities at Wageningen UR and 
other universities, and large companies; 
- the last sections of my talk contain a list of things I want 
to do in the field of research, education and outreach at 
Food Valley, and a special thanks to all of those who have 
been helpful in the creation of my own venture, here at 
Wageningen UR. 
to Innovative entrepreneurship 
'To be an entrepreneur, or not to be an entrepreneur', that is a 
relevant question for aspirant entrepreneurs, investors and 
educators, one that assumes that some people are natural-
born entrepreneurs whose personality traits have destined 
them for a life of entrepreneurship, while others simply do 
not have what it takes, and will never become entrepreneurs 
whatever the circumstances. Any attempt to divide the 
world into two camps in this way ignores the fact that there 
is a wide variety of entrepreneurial categories of individuals 
with various abilities and motivations and ventures with al-
ternative forms and goals (Gartner 1989; Sarasvathy 2004). 
Neither entrepreneurs nor non-entrepreneurs are alike in 
every respect, and the process of new venture creation and 
the subsequent stages one has to go through are different 
for everyone (Gartner, 1985; 1989). 
If we accept that there are no average entrepreneurs or new 
ventures, we should investigate the barriers to entrepre-
neurship (why do some people want to become an entrepreneur 
but they do not) and all its variations (Sarasvathy, 2004). For 
instance, one can make a distinction between 'nascent en-
trepreneurs', i.e. individuals who are actively trying to start 
a new firm but who have not done so yet, and 'actual en-
trepreneurs' who have already established a business that is 
up and running. The term 'nascent entrepreneurship' cov-
ers all the efforts that would-be founders, or aspiring entre-
preneurs, carry out to establish their own business, from 
making technical and commercial inquiries, writing a busi-
ness plan, taking business courses, putting a start-up team 
together, to approaching potential customers, etc. The ges-
tation process of new ventures ('from conception to birth'), 
is still somewhat of a mystery, and one that is largely ig-
nored in most studies (Reynolds & Miller, 1992; Carter, 
Gartner & Reynolds, 1996). What is also often overlooked 
is the process of team formation, propelling the venture in-
to the real world; there is a bias in existing studies towards 
lone founders and creative geniuses. Even though a large 
percentage of all high-technology start-ups is established by 
tightly-knit groups of founders, involving former colleagues 
and befriended specialists, and maybe complemented with 
friends and relatives, as far as most relevant literature is con-
cerned the team has already been formed and assembled 
(Kamm, Shuman, Seeger & Nurick, 1990). 
Management and organization studies have clearly over-
looked the emerging organization (Katz & Gartner, 1988; 
Gartner, Bird & Starr, 1992): there is a definite bias to-
wards established firms and institutions, and the emerging 
organization only plays a marginal role in the various theo-
ries and research activities. With the possible exception of 
the population ecology school (e.g. Aldrich, 1999; Hannan 
& Freeman, 1989), with its emphasis on the vulnerabilities 
of new organizations (because of their liabilities of newness 
and adolescence), most organization theories and defini-
tions are based on the assumption that organizations al-
ready exist: this is the 'taken for granted world of the exist-
ing organization (Gartner, Bird & Starr, 1992: 27)'. Given 
its overemphasis on these taken-for-granted and legitimate 
organizations (either large or small), that are continuously 
reinventing and reengineering themselves (or ought to do 
so), one could say that existing entrepreneurship literature 
sheds little light on what could be called 'pre-organizations 
and sub-organizations': those emerging organizations that 
are still in the process of learning and experimenting, inter-
preting feedback from the marketplace, and preparing the 
groundwork for a solid business, and that have a high 
propensity to fail. 
Entrepreneurship has something in common with alchemy 
(i.e. the medieval form of chemistry aimed at changing base 
metal into gold): both start with (almost) nothing (scrappy 
materials, good intentions and an ambition to create some-
thing new), and whereas the alchemist tries to make gold, 
the entrepreneur tries to build a company that will generate 
loads of money and/or fun. In (innovative) entrepreneur-
ship a remarkable transformation takes place from a situa-
tion where there is no entrepreneur, no organization and no 
business opportunity, to one where there is a new man (or 
woman), a perceived need for a new product, concept or 
service, and a new venture to exploit this business opportu-
nity. Timmons (1989: 1) provides an apt description of the 
creation and development of a venture and the alchemy of 
innovation: 'Entrepreneurship is the ability to create and 
build something from practically nothing. It is initiating, 
doing, achieving and building an enterprise or organiza-
tion, rather than just watching, analysing, or describing 
one. It is the knack for sensing an opportunity where oth-
ers see chaos, contradiction and confusion.' 
When we look at the variety of definitions of entrepreneur-
ship, some of which focus on the extraordinary activities of 
great individuals and leaders, new venture creation and 
business entry, entrepreneurial behaviour and innovation, 
while others even equate it to small business management 
and self-employment, we are left with a Babel-like confu-
sion. Various domains and approaches have been distin-
guished, which may in some cases even contradia each oth-
er (Shane, 2003). For instance, there are clear differences 
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between the entrepreneur and the small business owner: the 
former seeks to extend his business by actively pursuing in-
novation and growth, the latter perceives the business as an 
extension of his/her personality with no major effort in 
marketing and innovation (Carland, Hoy, Boulton & 
Carland, 1984). Also, independent entrepreneurship (i.e. 
self-employment) and intrapreneurship (or corporate entre-
preneurship) are not the same. There are, for instance, clear 
differences in the decision-making processes and the biases 
and heuristics used by entrepreneurs and managers in large 
organizations: compared to corporate managers, entrepre-
neurs will overestimate the probability of being right and 
overgeneralise from a few characteristics or observations 
(Busenitz & Barney, 1997). In addition, there are various 
ways to achieve business ownership: one can start up, pur-
chase or inherit a business, or alternatively be promoted by 
the existing owners of a company (e.g. Cooper & 
Dunkelberg, 1986). Furthermore, venturing has been iden-
tified either as a visionary, intuitive and creative process, or 
as a learning process in which the focus is on further devel-
oping skills and competences: whereas in the former of 
these definitions the myth of the great idea and the charis-
matic leader plays a crucial role, in the latter the gradual 
process of building a company with a dynamic set of capa-
bilities is considered much more important. 
Another pitfall in entrepreneurship and small business re-
search is the Schumpeterian bias, in other words, a strong 
focus on the innovativeness of entrepreneurial ideas and 
practices, the creative combination of old and new tech-
nologies and the entrepreneur as an extraordinary and rev-
olutionary force (Schumpeter, 1976; 2000). As many em-
pirical studies in the population ecology literature indicate 
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(e.g. Aldrich, 1999; Hannan & Freeman, 1989), the 
'Schumpeterian' entrepreneur is the exception rather than 
the rule, and most new firms imitate rather than innovate. 
As such, most new organisations are simple reproductions 
of existing ones rather than innovative creations, and only 
a very few manage to do something that has not been done 
before. Most entrepreneurs benefit from market imperfec-
tions and optimise existing possibilities; according to 
Kirzner (1997), they have the ability to be alert and spot 
opportunities that have not yet been seen by others. 
Over the last decade, attention has shifted away from the 
creative genius of the entrepreneur (the characteristics and 
functions of the entrepreneur), towards the nature and 
characteristics of entrepreneurial processes and events — 
such as opportunity identification, resource mobilization, 
the creation of new organizations, firm growth and net-
working (among others: Shane, 2003; Baron & Shane, 
2005; Bhidé, 2000; Stevenson, Grousbeck, Roberts & 
Bhidé, 2000; Timmons, 1989). In this respect, Gartner 
(1989: 58) in his analysis of the field of entrepreneurship 
argued that research should focus on what entrepreneurs do 
instead of what they are. In terms of identifying the role of 
entrepreneur in the world of business and separating it 
from roles and functions that are almost similar, a distinc-
tion could be made in terms of the degree of creativity and 
innovativeness involved, varying from low to high, and the 
knowledge and skill base, varying from thin to thick 
(Timmons, 1989; Timmons & Spinelli, 2003). Unlike 
managers and business promoters, entrepreneurs show not 
only a creative and innovative style through original prod-
ucts and concepts, but unlike inventors and promoters, 
they also possess a certain level of solid general manage-
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ment skills and business know-how (see table 1). 
Table 1 : Who Is the entrepreneur ? 
(Source: Timmons 1989: 21; 
Timmons & Spinell! 2003: 65) 












Shane (2003) places the ways particular business opportu-
nities can be exploited in another matrix, based on the one 
hand on whether a person is an independent individual (i.e. 
an employer or self-employed person) or a member of an 
organisation, and on the other hand on whether it was the 
individual or the member of an organisation who original-
ly spotted the opportunity. In table 2, we see that the in-
dependent start-up is different from the others because he 
or she is not only the one who discovers the new product, 
process or concept, but also the one who exploits it inde-
pendently. In a way this independent form could be con-
sidered the pure form of entrepreneurship. Other cases 
where independent individuals buy or license entrepre-
neurial assets, employees become risk-seeking employers, or 
corporations, through a pro-active and committed work-
force, both pursue and exploit opportunities, could be con-
sidered semi- or quasi-forms of entrepreneurship. 
Intrapreneurship and corporate venturing refer to the de-
velopment of innovative activities within a company and 
the strategic commitments and investments made by an es-
tablished corporation in internal ventures and/or start-ups 
respectively (Elfring, 2003). Extrapreneurship involves 
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bringing together a number of players in a joint venture, al-
lowing for spin-off creation, licensing and incubation, of-
ten involving an idea generator, entrepreneur, investor, 
source organisation, and/or incubator (Hulsink, 2003). 
Table 2: The Modes of «plottatlon 
(Source: Shane 2003:224) 
















In their definition of entrepreneurship Shane & 
Venkatamaran (2000: 218) emphasize that it is a 'nexus' 
that involves entrepreneurial individuals seizing lucrative 
opportunities: 'the field involves the study of sources of op-
portunities; the processes of discovery, evaluation, and ex-
ploitation of opportunities; and the set of individuals who 
discover, evaluate, and exploit them.' By actively linking the 
generation of ideas, concepts and products and the spotting 
and seizing of opportunities, these 'entrepreneurs' make a 
positive contribution to the innovativeness, economic ac-
tivities and dynamics of a country. There is another ingre-
dient we need to address in our discussion of the building 
blocks of entrepreneurship, and that is the new enterprise 
that is created by the new entrepreneur to exploit the idea 
or opportunity commercially and to market the innovation. 
In entrepreneurship research we should try to investigate 
the role new ventures play in furthering economic progress: 
entrepreneurs establish new organizations, non-entrepre-
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neurs do not (Gartner, 1989; Low & Macmillan, 1988; 
Low, 2001). It is important to emphasize that in the process 
of identifying and pursuing opportunities, entrepreneurial 
individuals - either acting on their own or inside an organ-
ization - have limited resources at their disposal and face 
major uncertainties and risks (in terms of demand, compe-
tition, supply, prices and the development of skills) 
(Stevenson, Grousbeck, Roberts & Bhidé, 2000; Stevenson 
& Jarillo, 1990). In the initial stages entrepreneurs often 
have to do more with less and use what abilities and re-
sources they have at their disposal, which are often the ones 
that are hidden, overlooked or neglected by others. In oth-
er words, most firms set out with a minimum of capital and 
a maximum of ingenuity and improvisation. 
Aware that attaining their goals and ambitions requires 
considerably greater resources than the ones to which they 
currendy have access, entrepreneurs have to be creative in 
how they use and acquire their resources. In this 'boot-
strapping' process (Bhidé, 1992; Winborg & Landstrom, 
2000) starting entrepreneurs can fall back on several tactics, 
such as working from home, buying used equipment or 
renting equipment (instead of buying new), generating 
word-of-mouth marketing, not being paid for 
shorter/longer periods, deliberately delaying payment to 
suppliers, exploiting cheap and flexible labour, and turning 
customers into sales personnel. As Starr & MacMillan 
(1990) put it, they have to be parsimonious with their as-
sets: buying only what is needed and using the rest without 
actually owning it, obtaining professional advice through 
friendship or the promise of future business, raising funds 
from family, bringing in cash flows before allowing major 
expenditures. In this phase entrepreneurs are 'hustlers' 
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(Bhidé, 1986): they act before they analyze, or act and an-
alyze simultaneously. Often the line between research and 
selling becomes blurred, and entrepreneurs will try to sell 
their product or service while they are officially looking for 
advice, information and initial commitment. New entre-
preneurs start out with a limited amount of knowledge and 
pursue modest strategies, with their initial successes depend-
ing on their ability to exploit unexpected opportunities. 
Their success depends on their ability to transform and up-
scale themselves as they grow in order to benefit from their 
increased size, allowing them to take on more capital-inten-
sive projects with more predictable outcomes (Bhidé, 2000). 
On the basis of these dynamic skills and modest and parsi-
monious planning, entrepreneurs learn and become more 
ambitious. Initially, stakeholders have a low level of commit-
ment, but as time goes by, they may increase their commit-
ment as the new entrepreneur proves to be a trusted partner. 
Smith & Miner (1983) were among the first to distinguish 
different types of entrepreneurs, firms and managerial mo-
tivations. Initially they identified the craftsman' and the 
'opportunistic entrepreneur', as well as the organizational 
vehicles with which they are associated, the rigid and the 
adaptive firm structure respectively. While the craftsman 
usually has a limited education and training and a low so-
cial awareness and involvement, finding it difficult to in-
teract with the social environment and operating within a 
limited time horizon, the opportunistic entrepreneur is 
known for his breadth in education and training, a high so-
cial awareness and involvement, a confidence in his ability 
to deal with the social environment and an awareness of 
and orientation towards the future. When I started prepar-
ing for this inaugural address, I realized that I was going to 
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need a gown (or 'toga' in Dutch), so I decided to look 
around for gown-makers. I talked to two companies that 
clearly reflected the two opposing configurations described 
by Smith and Miner. One of them was a craftsman that 
came highly recommended by Wageningen University (as 
well as by other universities in the country) - who nearly 
managed to intimidate me with talk of a waiting list of up 
to four months and who made it clear to me that I should 
consider myself lucky to be his customer. The other one 
was a tailor in the street where I live - who not only makes 
gowns for the academic and legal professions, but serves the 
airline industry as well, and who was happy to inform me 
that she could deliver my gown within a week. 
Miner and Smith, together with Bracker (1992), later iden-
tified a third category, the inventor-entrepreneur, who fo-
cuses on obtaining patents and making new products. 
Whereas the craftsman is in the business of making a better 
product and the opportunistic entrepreneur is trying to 
build a better company, the inventor-entrepreneur lives to 
invent: his or her sole purpose in doing business is discov-
ering new things and generating new products. If we are to 
analyze the past, present and possible future of the larger 
entrepreneurial setting of Wageningen and the Dutch agri-
culture industry as a whole, this classification is particular-
ly relevant. In the past, the industry was dominated by 
craftsmen, in addition to large established corporations and 
cooperatives further down the value chain, and the oppor-
tunistic entrepreneur was underrepresented (to some extent 
this role was played by the larger companies and coopera-
tives); today, Wageningen University, through its business 
generator and incubator, focuses more on promoting the 
inventor-entrepreneur, by facilitating the creation of tech-
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nology start-ups and spin-offs. In the more established seg-
ments of the Dutch agri-food industry, like the knowledge-
intensive life sciences, there is still room for the flexible, ag-
ile and innovative attitude of opportunistic and assertive 
(inventor-) entrepreneurs. 
... Networking & clustering ... 
Rather than selecting the best of a number of standard 
recipes, entrepreneurs gather their ingredients as they go 
along: they look around their workshop, kitchen or labora-
tory to see what is available and build their vision on the 
basis of affordable losses or acceptable risks (Sarasvathy, 
2001). Depending on their business experience and level of 
expertise as well as their goals and ambitions, the venturing 
activities of nascent entrepreneurs may vary substantially, 
and predetermine the start-up configuration and subse-
quent networking activities. While a fresh PhD researcher 
in his late twenties with only a few key names in his 
Rolodex may try to commercialize his invention through 
the research laboratory's incubator or seriously consider set-
ting up an entrepreneurial spin-off, a former senior engi-
neering consultant in his early forties may not need to rely 
on the active support of his parent organization because he 
has already built up his own support network. There are 
obvious as well as subtle differences between these two 
types of entrepreneurs, with regard to their self-confidence 
and efficacy as well as in the way others treat them in terms 
of status and the way their activities are evaluated. Because 
they lack stable relationships, access to sufficient resources 
and reputation, young and inexperienced entrepreneurs are 
prone to a liability of newness or adolescence (Hannan & 
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Freeman, 1989). If they are to survive they need to gain ac-
cess to the resources and information they require and es-
tablish the partnerships that will bring them political clout 
and overall credibility (Elfring & Hulsink, 2003; Hulsink, 
Manuel & Stam, 2004). 
Networks are important in the innovation processes of start-
up firms and small and medium-sized firms, since 'innovation 
does not exist in a vacuum' (Van De Ven, 1986: 601). On the 
one hand, the contacts a firm has can provide opportunities 
for further innovation and growth, and eventually lead to a 
better performance, while on the other hand they may lead to 
inertia and stagnation, for instance when the wrong advice is 
followed or the wrong partner chosen, or when the firm is 
locked into a leading firm or a sector in decline (de Jong & 
Hulsink, 2005). In the former case the existing social network 
or new business contact provides opportunities for growth 
and success, whereas in the latter case the existing network or 
new business contact turns out to have a constraining or even 
detrimental impact on the firm's performance. The search for 
and use of social capital is driven by goal-specificity: it only in-
cludes those ties that help a firm attain particular goals. The 
network of a small firm may range from of a loose collection 
of ties to a close-knit business group in which the focal or-
ganization is strongly embedded. 
Networks can be described in terms of i) diversity, ii) 
strength of relationships, iii) structural holes (de Jong & 
Hulsink, 2005). Network diversity refers to the number of 
actors in the network, what they do and for what they can 
be contacted. Highly diverse networks consist of partners 
with distinct, non-redundant abilities. Various partners 
may be able to contribute financial capital (e.g, banks, ac-
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countants, relatives), physical capital (suppliers) or human 
capital (educational institutes). In the context of innova-
tion, new customer preferences may be a source of inspira-
tion, but customers can also contribute to the realization of 
new products by providing feedback on a first concept or 
by acting as lead users (Von Hippel, 1988). The strength of 
relationships refers to the contradiction of strong versus 
weak ties (Granovetter, 1973; 1995). Strong tries are rela-
tionships one can rely upon both in good times and in bad 
times. They tend to bind similar parties in longer-term and 
intense relationships. Of course, strong ties are not the 
panacea of good networking. A network consisting only of 
strong ties may limit a firm's ability to discover information 
regarding opportunities. Weak ties can be beneficial as well 
in that they offer new kinds of information, resources, etc. 
Structural holes refer to the position of a firm in its network 
structure. A structural hole is a relationship of non-redun-
dancy between two contacts. It may imply that the firm is 
connected to disconnected others, to paraphrase Burt 
(1992), or that the network partners do not know each oth-
er. Structural holes provide information advantages to peo-
ple who manage to build across cohesive groups, exploiting 
a position at the edge of two groups. They are extremely 
important when it comes to seizing and exploiting oppor-
tunities for innovation and new businesses. 
Successful innovation requires a collective effort in bringing 
together people, ideas and objects that were previously sep-
arate, and an effective networking among heterogeneous 
ties spanning various markets and technologies. Innovators 
and entrepreneurs put inventions together from what they 
already know and recombine existing ideas and practices 
from other industries and innovators (Hargadon, 2003). 
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Edison, for instance, owed his success not so much to his 
ability to build something out of nothing, but rather to the 
way he managed to exploit his network, borrow the ideas of 
others, and incorporate and recombine them in his break-
through innovations. Edison is an example of a technology 
broker, someone who links otherwise disconnected com-
munities in an attempt to maximize their range of connec-
tions. By doing so, a technology broker is in a better posi-
tion to be the first to see how people, ideas and objects of 
one world may provide valuable solutions in another. An 
example of a company acting very much like Edison is the 
invention factory IDEO, a company that tries to capitalize 
on the connections it has with many different industries 
that may not know each other for its commercial innova-
tions (Hargadon & Sutton, 1997). As a true (technology) 
broker, IDEO also clearly benefits from its central position 
and gaps in the flow of information between subgroups in 
a larger network, filling these gaps by combining technolo-
gies from within and outside its client's industry into new 
solutions. Because they are connected to a wider variety of 
industries, knowledge brokers typically have access to a 
broader range of ideas than firms working in one or a few 
industries. Technology brokers like IDEO and Edison 
bring together flows of information at the right moment 
and design solutions in one area that are potentially valu-
able to others (Hargadon, 1998). 
In the 1980s large integrated firms with their extensive pro-
duction systems driven by cost and price leadership con-
cerns found it increasingly difficult to meet the demands for 
product and process innovation and the flexible manufac-
turing of high-quality products (Nemetz & Fry, 1988). 
Strategic networks of heterogeneous firms involving ongo-
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ing and complex partnerships combine the flexibility of 
market relationships with the long-term commitment of hi-
erarchical management (Powell, 1990). Lorenzoni & Baden 
Fuller (1995) have paid attention to the role of the strategic 
centre of corporations in managing such a network of part-
ners. In strategic networks, the central firms are remarkable 
in their desire to transfer skills and knowledge, and add val-
ue to their partners. Typically, they set out to build up their 
partners' ability and competencies and create a sense of 
common purpose across multiple levels in the value chain 
and across various sectors. Strategic networks can be seen as 
a deliberate choice by management, made to increase the 
strategic flexibility and responsiveness of the core companies 
and to facilitate, in close collaboration with specialized part-
ners, the development and launching of new products or 
process innovations. There are a number of reasons for the 
emergence of networks in the high-technology sectors, such 
as a shortening of the product life cycle, the rationalization 
of R&D and production costs, the need for system integra-
tion in converging markets, the concentration on core com-
petencies and the contracting out of peripheral activities 
(Bolland & Hofer, 1998; Quinn, Baruch & Zien, 1997). 
High-tech firms follow a kind of spider's web strategy, in 
that they try to develop and maintain direct and (almost) 
exclusive relationships with satellite companies from the 
strategic centre where the core company is located (Hagel, 
1996). Strategic investments may have been made by the 
core company, often through equity stakes in preferred sup-
pliers and spin-off companies, a joint information system 
and shared knowledge and co-manufacturing between the 
core company and its satellites. Management literature talks 
about 'unbundling the corporation' (Hagel & Singer, 
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2000): the twin activities of design and manufacturing in-
creasingly seem to conflict in today's virtual corporations. 
Whereas design focuses on responding swiftly to new ideas, 
nurturing the talents of managers and employees and seiz-
ing new business opportunities, manufacturing is mainly 
about economies of scale and scope. Therefore, it is often 
better to separate those activities into specialized businesses 
that have clear advantages over integrated companies. The 
distinction between key and peripheral functions is made 
between the core competencies which are vital to a firm's 
creativity, innovativeness, and long-term viability, such as 
R&D, intellectual property and design, and supportive 
(non-core) functions, which may include manufacturing, 
often put at arm's length or outsourced, through networks 
of supportive relationships with contract partners. 
In addition to looking at the dynamic capabilities and 
growth strategies of core firms, and the strategic networks 
in which they are embedded, the role and involvement of 
key firms could become even bigger: they could feed in-
dustrial districts (Lazerson & Lorenzoni, 1999a). The 
process of globalization and international sourcing has 
made the larger multinational firms more aware of the 
competitive advantages of particular regions or districts. 
Ambitious flagship firms, together with their subcontrac-
tors, may create endogenous clusters, if they successfully ex-
plore commercial avenues with their partners, and hence 
diffuse technology and knowledge at the local level. Besides 
a high R&D intensity, high technology industries are char-
acterized by a greater than average dependence on skilled, 
professional and technical labour, especially for the non-
routine and innovative activities. In this respect, proximity 
matters: in order to exchange codified and tacit knowledge, 
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engineers of large firms and specialized suppliers prefer 
face-to-face communication (on top of electronically-medi-
ated communication). In addition to transferring skills and 
know-how from large to small firms, local training and in-
novation institutions may also help upgrade the level of ca-
pabilities and the knowledge base in a region. Since firms 
that are located in strong clusters are more likely to inno-
vate and create spillovers within and between industries and 
furthermore regional collaboration furthers an endogenous 
division of labour and offers substantial economies of 
times, the benefits are clear: 'the locational effects save time 
since the partners share updated knowledge and work on 
signals rather than complex contracts (Lorenzoni & 
Lipparini, 1999: 335).' 
However, if these industrial districts become too inward-
looking and insulated, they may lose their momentum and 
suffer from inertia. In order to benefit from new technical 
and market-related information (e.g. new technologies and 
products, changing customer tastes), local focal firms also 
need to be well-connected to distant networks. 
Connections to other industrial districts or direct access to 
and representation at key input or output markets will pro-
vide them with new competitive challenges and generate 
new strategic partners with open minds and additional ca-
pabilities. In that respect, flagship firms act as conductors 
of their indigenous industrial district and distinct collectors 
and pollinators of information and skills from elsewhere 
(Lazerson & Lorenzoni, 1999b). 
to Technology Transfer in the agri-food business . 
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If we look at the composition of the Dutch agri-food sector 
between 1950 and 1990, we can say that, with the exception 
of a few large agro-chemical and food companies and coop-
eratives, the large majority consisted of small business own-
ers, most of them family-owned and -run, and self-employed 
farmers. In a world economy where, until the 1980s, com-
panies still largely focused on domestic markets, the Dutch 
agri-food producers were among the pioneers selling their 
products abroad. To this day the Netherlands is the largest 
agricultural exporter in the European Union, with leading 
positions (i.e. to be among the top five) in flowers and plants, 
potato production, pig farming and milk production (de 
Bont & van Berkum 2004; Boone, de Bont & Poppe, 1996). 
In addition, this active export orientation, the successes of 
the Dutch flowers and food clusters were the result of an ef-
fective innovation system based on the Research, Education 
and Extension (REE) triptych (in Dutch: het Onderzoek, 
Voorlichtingen Onderwijs (OVO) drieluik) (van de Ban 1987; 
van de Ban & Bauwens 1988; Peper, 1996). This REE/OVO 
triptych is a linear knowledge and innovation chain where 
basic and applied research is extended to education and to 
the population of farmers and growers: 
research is carried out by the agricultural university and 
other universities, government research institutes, ex-
periment stations, and the privately owned R&D labo-
ratories of corporations and cooperatives; 
- education is organized by specialized academic and pro-
fessional education centres and vocational schools; 
extension is structured by an elaborate system of exper-
iment stations and service agencies that involves private 
and public organizations and professionals providing 
technical assistance to the nations farmers and growers.^  
Although the basic purpose of (cooperative) extension is to 
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bring relevant innovations to the attention of farmers and 
growers, there is also another objective that is somewhat 
underutilized, namely to bring the problems and challenges 
facing farmers and growers to the attention of university re-
searchers and teachers (Postlewait, Parker & Zilberman, 
1993). 
Despite its successful exports, traditionally the agricultural 
sector has been very much inward-looking, supply-oriented 
and with a low to modest level of innovativeness. From the 
1980s onwards it became clear that the large-scale produc-
tion of bulk products and integrated supply chains no 
longer guaranteed a strong competitive position. A produc-
tion system based on simply supplying commodities to the 
food industry (e.g. dairy, meat) or selling through auctions 
(flowers and vegetables) with a single focus on efficiency 
and productivity increases lacked the right set of incentives 
for the farmers and their organisations to innovate and 
change (Diederen, van Meijl & Wolters, 2000). Consumers 
near and far had developed a taste for high-quality and new 
original products, and thus provided responsive and flexible 
agri-food producers with demand for differentiated prod-
ucts in the up-market segment. In addition, in the 1990s 
strong regulations addressing growing food safety concerns 
and the ongoing exploitation of natural resources (e.g. sea, 
soil, vegetation and livestock) made adjustments in the ex-
isting Dutch agri-food value chain unavoidable, which in 
some cases even meant looking for alternative forms of pro-
duction. The Dutch flower cluster managed to survive rel-
atively easily, using the stagnation in demand to stir up its 
R&D effort and churn out differentiated and better prod-
ucts. Most of the agricultural sector, however, was severely 
in crisis, realizing that a change had to be made from a pro-
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duction system based on economies of scale, process inno-
vation and output maximization, towards a system based 
on diversified quality production, with an emphasis on 
economies of scope, quality and flexibility. 
Furthermore, the agricultural system of innovation through 
extension and joint interest representation started to disin-
tegrate and came under political pressure. In his official as-
signment to the Minister to put forward recommendations 
to modernize Dutch agriculture, Peper (1996) qualified the 
sector as internally-open but externally closed and hence 
proposed privatizing the information and services agency 
DLV and merging the Wageningen Agricultural University 
and the Netherlands Foundation for Agricultural Research 
DLO (until then part of the Ministry). My Wageningen 
colleagues Elfring (1999), Omta (2002), Dons (2003) and 
Mulder (2004) in their inaugural addresses all referred to 
the gap in the Dutch agricultural innovation system, point-
ing out that the established system is now being challenged 
by the promotion of entrepreneurship in the agri-food sci-
ences and a more open and outward-looking knowledge in-
frastructure. Increasingly, words like innovation and entre-
preneurship emerged in all kinds of policy documents, and 
became buzzwords in the corridors of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Wageningen University, and the R&D labs 
and headquarters of agri-food companies. 
From the 1990s onwards the sector has become increasing-
ly dynamic, both in a positive and in a negative way. In ad-
dition to numerous firm exits and business transfers, we 
have seen new entrants and re-born agricultural firms with 
alternative approaches and competencies, pursuing new 
product, process and service concept innovations (Rutten 
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& van Oosten, 1999). Now the Ministry of Agriculture 
finds the key to structural change among innovative entre-
preneurs, who bring in some creativity and variety to the 
agri-food sector by pursuing all kinds of opportunities tra-
ditional farmers and firms have never considered (LNV, 
2001). For that purpose some of those 'new farmers' and 
'agro-entrepreneurs' have even formed study clubs and al-
ternative networks sharing information and best practices, 
and effectively questioning the REE/OVO system (de 
Groot, 2003). It is a change that has opened the door to ex-
periments with alternative farming methods and new busi-
ness concepts (e.g. landscaping, rural tourism) and prod-
ucts (e.g. functional foods and organic farming), and inno-
vations in business processes and distribution (i.e. intro-
ducing tracking and tracing systems and value added logis-
tics, certification, etc.). An example of a farmer who has 
managed to become a successful innovative entrepreneur is 
the dairy producer Heida, who sells his home-made and ar-
tisan yoghurt products in corporate restaurants throughout 
the country (seeking autonomy from his dairy cooperative 
and avoiding the power of the supermarkets) and who dis-
tributes his products himself as well (Agrarisch Dagblad, 
2005; van Uffelen, van den Ham & Splinter, 2005). 
Now that we have addressed the relevance of innovation 
and entrepreneurship for the agri-food sector, we need to 
look at the origins of those new ideas and new or reborn 
firms. Traditionally there were three mechanisms to dis-
seminate technical and commercial information in agricul-
tural communities: 
the first one is the transfer of knowledge and skills from 
father to son (which is still in use today); 
the second one was a short-lived experiment in the 19 
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century to equip clergymen and priests with sufficient 
agricultural knowledge to help farmers in poor and ru-
ral areas (van der Haar, 1993a: 11-30); 
- the system of knowledge generation and subsequent ex-
tension of the knowledge to educators and practitioners 
(via intermediaries) is another method of technology 
transfer, which was and still is popular. 
Technology transfer has to do with the development of an 
idea from a (public or private) laboratory into a commer-
cial product; in this case involving the transfer of people, 
knowledge, know-how and practices from university to in-
dustry and society. In order to manage the transfer of 
knowledge effectively dedicated offices within a university 
or company may well be expanded or established or new 
organizational forms outside the parent (or source) organi-
zation may be developed that are designed to move the 
product from the laboratory to the market place. The key 
mechanisms in technology transfer are cooperative exten-
sion and outreach on the one hand, and patenting, licens-
ing and spin-off creation on the other (Postlewait, Parker & 
Zilberman, 1993). While the former focuses on the devel-
opment and dissemination of publicly available (non-
shielded) agricultural technologies, the latter is aimed at 
making money from the inventions of public or corporate 
researchers through the sale of patents, licensing and royal-
ty payments, and equity in spin-off companies. In the for-
mer case, there is a strong belief in the free dissemination of 
knowledge, for instance through publishing, consulting, 
one-to-one interaction between university and industry sci-
entists, and personnel exchanges and the idea of appropri-
ating and commercializing intellectual property is opposed. 
In the latter case, alternatively, private gains from academic 
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research are sought and secrecy requirements to protect 
proprietary information are met: the university starts li-
censing its intellectual property rights (IPR) in exchange for 
cash, (future) sponsored research or equity (i.e. taking 
shares in new ventures). Knowledge transfer through an 
Office of Technology Transfer and Licensing is a complex 
matter that depends on encouraging researchers to partici-
pate actively in the commercial exploitation of an organiza-
tion's intellectual capital, creating proper and transparent 
incentives, and pooling critical specialized resources to set 
up effective patenting and licensing agreements and gener-
ate successful spin-offs (Debackere & Vleugelers, 2005). 
A parent company's technology can, for instance, be com-
mercialized by an external entrepreneur (actively supported 
by the parent company). Alternatively, inventors and idea-
developers can enter into a partnership with an incubator 
to develop their concepts further and start up their own 
company. Within the spin-off process four different roles 
can be identified: the inventor, the (often internal) entre-
preneur, the source or parent organization and the external 
investor (in the words of Roberts & Malone (1996): tech-
nology originator, entrepreneur, source Organization & venture 
investor). Ideally these four are all actively represented, but 
is also possible that, for example, the internal entrepreneur 
or the external investor are absent from the commercializa-
tion process. To facilitate a spin-off in such a situation the 
parent organization will have to persuade external entrepre-
neurs to take a license for the developed technology and to 
work together with the internal inventor(s). If there is a lack 
of financial means in the initial stages, the parent company 
will have to look for venture capitalists or itself participate 
financially in the new product. In the start-up of new busi-
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nesses supported by incubators, similar roles can be identi-
fied, the role of entrepreneur/inventor, the incubator as ac-
tive mentor of the start-up company (for instance by offer-
ing housing and coaching), the investment role of the in-
cubator, and the incubator as liaison with professional serv-
ice providers (specialized law firms, accountants, etc.). In 
the Netherlands, Biopartner and Twinning were established 
as incubating networks for the life sciences and ICT re-
spectively, to launch a whole range of activities to promote 
new venture creation and fast firm growth (Biopartner, 
2002-2005; Elfring & Hulsink, 2000). 
Entrepreneurs are better than others (i.e. investors, tech-
nology transfer officials) at identifying and appreciating op-
portunities, i.e. future states that are desirable and achiev-
able, and at obtaining additional relevant information, be-
cause they have prior knowledge and relevant life experi-
ence (e.g. through previous jobs, expertise about particular 
markets, customers, distribution). In other words, whether 
or not they recognize or perceive an opportunity depends 
on their own specialized and personal knowledge base. It al-
so means that they will be predisposed to recognizing op-
portunities in areas with which they are familiar but not in 
other sectors, even though opportunities there may be more 
promising. This implies that it is unlikely that two entre-
preneurs will identify similar opportunities and that, once 
an opportunity has been recognized, entrepreneurs and in-
vestors may have different interpretations of what the op-
portunity is. When we apply this to the domain of tech-
nology transfer, it becomes clear that it is difficult to cen-
tralize opportunity exploitation; hence the critical early 
stages of commercialising knowledge (screening, selecting, 
prototyping) should take place bottom up and operate close 
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to the scientists, engineers and research groups involved 
(Debackere & Vleugelere, 2005). Shane (2000), for in-
stance, identified eight different ventures that exploited a 
single MIT invention, namely three-dimensional printing 
(3DP ). This patented manufacturing technology was 
commercialized by entrepreneurs and firms with various in-
dustrial backgrounds (e.g. an architectural service agency, 
chemical manufacturer, and a photo retail chain). In addi-
tion, an entrepreneur's perspective will be influenced by the 
social networks to which he or she has access, and he or she 
may possess specific abilities that will affect the way he or 
she looks for information (e.g. quick and selective) as well 
as the way he or she sees things (perceptive ability, not-see-
ing risks). 
... Wageningen UR, Food Valley and the NEW Research 
Triangle ... 
If we look at the history of the Wageningen University and 
the Netherlands Foundation for Agricultural Research 
(DLO), we get the impression that Wageningen UR, inte-
grating the University and the Ministry's research laborato-
ries, has arrived almost a century late. Of course this is with 
hindsight: both institutions started in Wageningen, the agri-
cultural school that preceded the university was established 
in 1876, and the first experiment station in the country, 
propelling practical research and experimentation which lat-
er evolved into the DLO Foundation, a year later. Looking 
back at the history of the University and the DLO founda-
tion, we realize that things could easily have turned out dif-
ferently (van der Haar 1993a, b; Faber, 1993). In its forma-
tive years, Wageningen was lucky to be chosen by the na-
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tional government as the location for the only national 
mid/higher-level school in agriculture (thanks to its central 
location and a pro-active municipality providing free prem-
ises), beating, among others, Warffum (Groningen). When 
it was decided that the country needed a national agricul-
tural university, Wageningens claim was again contested by 
the other universities, contemptuous of the academic aspi-
rations of what they felt was a mere polytechnic. However, 
to avoid having to spend time and money it was decided to 
keep things the way they were and upgrade Wageningen to 
be established as a university in 1918. Merging Wageningen 
University with the Veterinary School of Utrecht University 
or with Radboud University Nijmegen was discussed regu-
larly over the years as well, even recently, but never materi-
alized. Instead, in 1997, Wageningen University and DLO 
decided to join forces and establish WU&R. 
Wageningen UR (2005a) is unique among the Dutch uni-
versities in a number of ways: 
- the university specializes almost exclusively in the plant 
and animal sciences, agri-business and food technology, 
and environmental sciences, and as such, unlike any 
other university in the Netherlands, does not have any 
specific faculties; 
the student/staff ratio is almost 1 to 1, with about 6,500 
students (including approximately 1200 PhDs) and 
7,000 professional staff (about 4,000 of whom work as 
researchers); 
because of its close ties to the various experiment and 
applied research stations over the years and its merger 
with the DLO Foundation, formerly part of the respec-
tive Ministry of Agriculture, the new entity called 
Wageningen UR can be considered the only true 
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American-style research university in the Netherlands^; 
- furthermore, the university's activities are not strictly 
confined to its home city Wageningen but also include 
major research centres in Lelystand, IJmuiden, and The 
Hague, and approximately 35 smaller data & account-
ancy and experiment stations throughout the country. 
This was shown very clearly in the University's weekly 
magazine WB (No. 21, 30 June, 2005: pp.10-11) in 
which a map of the Netherlands was included that was 
covered almost completely by the numerous establish-
ments of Wageningen UR, and which suggested chang-
ing the university's name to Nederland UR (see below). 
In addition to providing education and carrying out re-
search, recently a third objective was formulated, one which 
is currently being implemented, namely the active use and 
commercialization of the University's knowledge base (in 
Dutch: valorisatie) (Wageningen UR, 2003). The assump-
tion is that the commercial value of the University's intel-
lectual property (IP) can be marketed more actively. 
Neither the university nor the DLO Foundation have a 
long tradition of patenting, and if there is one it is very 
idiosyncratic, depending on the people involved, their 
drives and predominant financing mechanisms (Jongen, 
Kleter, Lelieveld & van der Meer, 2004). While the univer-
sity conducted discovery-based research, DLO carried out 
applied research on behalf of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
and practical research was carried out by the experiment 
stations, jointly financed by the government and the farm-
ers or growers involved. Although the University hired its 
first technology transfer official in 1981, patenting re-
mained a marginal activity until 2002; the situation was 
not much different at the DLO Foundation, where in 1999 
a mere 9,7% of the revenues originated form consulting 
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and patents/licenses (Van der Haar, 1993b; Faber 1993: 
236; Annual Reports WAU, DLO & WUR, 1995-2004). 
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Figure 1 (source: Wageningen UR 2005a: 34-34) Early 2000, 
when the university and DLO were busy implementing the 
merger, a clear need was felt to commercialize the abun-
dantly available knowledge and to translate it into a num-
ber of smaller projects (Wageningen UR, 2003), such as: 
pursuing an active IP policy aimed at generating rev-
enues and creating a scouting and support infrastruc-
ture for that purpose; 
launching new spin-off businesses and actively promot-
ing, supporting and acquiring new knowledge-intensive 
35 
businesses; 
- creating a commercial awareness among researchers and 
lecturers and encouraging them to look for opportunities 
for consultancy, contract research, and new products; 
- stimulating entrepreneurship among students and staff 
members. 
The first two goals are being addressed by the newly creat-
ed Wageningen Business Generator (WBG) (Jongen, 
Kleter, Lelieveld, van der Meer, 2004). Given the knowl-
edge that is available and the value it may represent, and the 
dominant contract research tradition, WBG faces this chal-
lenge with a dedicated technology transfer policy to in-
crease licensing to external entrepreneurs and businesses, 
and to generate new business, spinning out from 
Wageningen UR. The other two activities have been allo-
cated to academics such as myself and business developers 
working in their various research units and departments. 
When we look at the entrepreneurial attitudes of the regu-
lar students and alumni, there is still some work to be done. 
For instance, some 50% of the 25,000 alumni work in the 
private sector, while the other half works for not-for-profit 
organizations, educational institutions and governments 
(Wageningen UR, 2005a). More precise data on how many 
of the Wageningen University alumni that work in the pri-
vate sector are actually self-employed or own a business are 
not yet available, although it has been estimated that it ap-
plies to a maximum of 5 % of the total population, ap-
proximately 1,000 to 1,500 alumni (KLV, 2005). In a re-
cent survey among 445 alumni-entrepreneurs conducted to 
measure their level of interest in becoming involved in 
start-up, spin-off and business generation activities, it 
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turned out that most of them (almost 80%) were active in 
the areas of consultancy, catering and trading, with only 
15% working in production. The sad conclusion is that the 
population of Wageningen-educated entrepreneurs is a very 
small one, and if we look more closely, we see that most of 
them operate in low-innovative and services-oriented sec-
tors. To end on a positive note, the large majority of the 
alumni-business owners were willing to help other 
Wageningen-affiliated nascent and actual entrepreneurs 
with advice, coaching, financial support. 
Wageningen is a leading centre for agri-business and food 
research in Europe, centred around the internationally 
renowned university. In terms of the availability of public 
and private research laboratories, there is the Wageningen 
Centre for Food Sciences (WCFS), which is a powerful al-
liance of European food corporations such as Unilever, 
DSM Nutrition and Friesland Dairy, to name a few, and 
the public food research laboratories, including 
Wageningen University and, within close range, NIZO 
Food Research (Ede) and T N O Food (Zeist). Adjacent to 
the university and the private research labs of Numico and 
Campina DMV, there is a concentration of dynamic and 
innovative companies that work together with leading play-
ers in the life sciences and agri-food industry, including 
Keygene, Noldus, Bfactory and Checkpoints. Also, there is 
the Biopartner Centre Wageningen, which acts as an incu-
bator for new projects and products (e.g. Campina 
Innovation) and fledgling businesses (such as Easygene, 
Catchmabs and Genetwister). The municipality of 
Wageningen and the regional development agency GOM 
(a predecessor of Oost NV) have played a supportive and 
pro-active role in real estate development by working to-
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gether with the University in developing the Agro-science 
park Wageningen in the early 1990s and the Biopartner 
Center Wageningen at the start of the new millennium. 
Some years ago this diverse cluster, with its combination of 
education, industry and local/regional governments work-
ing together, was given the name Food Valley. Although it 
has not reached the level of Silicon Valley yet, qualifying it 
as a miniature Silicon Valley certainly makes sense, the way 
Wageningen University was seen by its rivals as a 'miniature 
university' (van der Haar 1993a: 148). Let us not forget 
that it took Silicon Valley over 50 years to replace the Santa 
Clara fruit orchards with offices and business parks of suc-
cessful homegrown companies like Intel, Hewlett & 
Packard, Apple, Cisco and SUN, who from the 1970s on-
wards capitalized on the local development and production 
of semiconductors and computers (Hulsink, Bouwman & 
Manuel, 2000). 
There is a Research Triangle in the making in the East of 
the Netherlands: it involves three universities, namely 
Radboud University Nijmegen (bio-medical and health 
knowledge), Twente University Enschede (with an empha-
sis on technology and engineering), Wageningen University 
& Research (with a strong focus on agri-food & life sci-
ences), and the regional development agency Oost 
(Regiegroep Oost, 2004a, b). The triangle covers roughly 
the economic area between the universities of Nijmegen, 
Enschede en Wageningen, which was why the initial name 
that was given to this project was the NEW Triangle, later 
the epithet 'NEW' was dropped. In addition to promoting 
synergies between three specific domains and three knowl-
edge and research poles, the project is aimed at bringing to-
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gether three different kinds of partners, namely universities, 
local/regional governments and businesses. The ambition 
of the Triangle project team is to be among the world's top 
five in their respective fields within 10 years. Although it is 
a very ambitious and complex project, it could provide a 
way to mobilize forces to promote entrepreneurship, inno-
vation and economic development in the East Netherlands. 
... to knowledge farming ... 
Now that I have almost reached the end of my address, I 
want to talk about the title 'from farming knowledge to 
knowledge farming', and play with the meaning of the con-
cept of farming, its history and options for the future, to 
define a new kind of farming. I want to bring together 
farming in its traditional - and agricultural - sense and 
farming in its new sense, with its emphasis on the explo-
ration and exploitation of knowledge and technology by in-
novative and dynamic entrepreneurs. Ehrenfeld (2002) 
compares entrepreneurship to farming and gardening, and 
he talks of identifying and planting the seeds, nourishing 
and feeding the plant to make it grow, and ultimately har-
vesting the fruits of one's labour. What is missing in this 
metaphor is the broader picture that emerges when all the 
gardens are combined into a single ecosystem or park, a 
place where researches, educators and entrepreneurs are all 
involved in technology and knowledge farming. One ex-
ample of such a park in the making is Food Valley, centred 
in and around Wageningen, where there is central knowl-
edge institution, R&D-intensive establishments of large 
and small firms, and all kind of networks that connect the 
various actors involved in this endeavour into a vibrant 
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cluster (see figure 2, see below). 
New concepts like technology farming and wind farming 
highlight the new meaning farming is about to obtain. 
Although there is still a sense of pioneering, taming the 
wild, venturing into the known and unknown with (recus-
ing and cultivating knowledge continuously, and ultimate-
ly reaping the rewards, this term is slightly different from 
the original notion of the traditional farming activities I 
have just described. The traditional farmer, (re-)educated 
and acquiring new knowledge through the OVO/REE sys-
tem, is being replaced by a new knowledge farmer using his 
laboratory, which can be an R&D establishment but also 
invention factories used by international chefs like Ferran 
Adria and IDEO, the product design company, as a play-
ground and incubator for generating and selecting new 
ideas and concepts. Despite incremental production in-
creases over the years, it has become clear that the tradi-
tional farming was myopic and locked-in to established 
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players, practices and platforms; opportunities for more 
radical or sustainable product and process innovations and 
the emergence of new firms and spin-offs were ignored, 
marginalized or smothered by subsidies, instead of taking 
them seriously as potential new business cases. The devel-
opment of new high-quality product markets, safety and lo-
cality characteristics, the introduction of far-reaching 
process innovations and improved distribution systems and 
value chains, the cultivation of new breeds, and the expan-
sion of traditional agriculture to include land/park mainte-
nance management and leisure, and educational activities, 
have only now appeared on the policy agenda. Although 
this is relatively late, it is not yet too late. 
Knowledge farming is about developing technologies and 
ideas, screening them and finding business opportunities to 
exploit them through licensing or selling intellectual prop-
erty, and generating spin-off firms.^ The idea of technolo-
gy or knowledge farming was pioneered by Gordon 
Campbell, who with his incubator network Techfarm ven-
tures grows startups of all shapes and sizes. After a long 
managerial and entrepreneurial career in the semiconductor 
industry, he set up Techfarm Ventures in 1993, to promote 
the creation and growth of a multitude of projects, ventures 
and new firms around a flagship company, both literally 
and virtually, with the aim of pushing the technology or in-
dustry forward. Knowledge farming does not involve a 
grand design to build a single cathedral over time (Duby, 
2002), nor is it based on the myopic notion that what 
works today will work tomorrow, but instead it treats the 
time horizon not as a constraint but as a gateway to a mul-
titude of opportunities that all contain interesting options 
on the future, to be anticipated and prepared for by devel-
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oping an evolving portfolio of activities. Knowledge farm-
ing is basically about investing in tomorrow's opportunities 
and future capabilities by encouraging 'a thousand new 
firms' to flourish. Such a process of experimentation may 
lead to the discovery of new opportunities and the unfold-
ing of unforeseen initiatives: through their actions these 
new entrepreneurs and firms may discover new possibilities 
and play a dynamic role in affecting the value of those op-
portunities. 
The new real options approach zooms in and seeks to man-
age the links between current actions and the set of uncer-
tain futures and upcoming heterogeneous possibilities of 
actors in dynamic environments, such as R&D investments 
and high-tech development.5 Instead of previous 'study & 
wait' and 'wait & see' methods to forecast, prepare for and 
enact the future, the real options perspective argues in 
favour of 'act and see' approach by investing in options on 
future possibilities, and subsequently these options can be 
exercised through follow-on investments (when the results 
are promising) or abandoned (in case the results are disap-
pointing). The real options approach is especially relevant 
to universities, other R&D institutions and 
incubators/business generators, where the widespread com-
mercialization of knowledge and betting on new technolo-
gies, new firms and start-up entrepreneurs to be eventually 
successful through all kinds of mechanisms has become in-
creasingly important. Among a portfolio of initiatives they 
can make selections based on which outcomes merit to be 
continued and which ones abandoned, hereby reducing 
downside risk while maintaining upside risk. 
A good example of what could be called 'knowledge farm-
42 
ing' in the larger Wageningen setting is the Action Plan Key 
Area Flowers and Food that was recendy developed in re-
sponse to a call by the national governments Innovation 
Platform for interesting ideas and projects (Wageningen 
UR, 2005b). The objective is to upgrade and upscale the 
Dutch horticultural system by abandoning the linear inno-
vation model, from R&D establishment to experiment sta-
tions to all kind of extension activities, and replacing it with 
a variety of joint innovative activities and public-private 
partnerships. While there are projects in the overall plan 
that address the issues of technology transfer and the devel-
opment of innovative competencies and skills among small 
business owners (e.g. spotting opportunities), the impor-
tance of innovative entrepreneurs and new businesses to a 
future vibrant horticultural cluster has not been fully ac-
knowledged. The contribution of tomorrow's new entrants 
that will venture into the unknown can, of course, not 
match the short-term package deals of the established play-
ers and inclusive lobbies of trade associations (representing 
horizontal or vertical chains of activities), and public-pri-
vate partnerships. In order to close the knowledge gap be-
tween public R&D institutes and private sector firms, be-
tween large companies and small and medium-sized enter-
prises, the mobility of people, knowledge and other assets 
in innovation systems needs to be increased by every means 
available. In all these plans there has to be a focus to allo-
cate resources, give room to new entrants and facilitate the 
creation of new firms, because there is another 'virtual' 
knowledge gap that needs to be addressed. We need to find 
ways to bridge the gap between, on the one hand, existing 
firms, both large and small, and public institutions with 
their focus on the here and now, and, on the other hand, 
the innovators of tomorrow in their quest for possible holy 
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grails and breakthrough solutions. 
The focus on local and predictable findings and the inher-
ent bias towards short-term discovery and venturing 
processes may drive out longer-term and distant search and 
experimentation. In that respect we should not forget the 
statement made by Alexander Graham Bell, one of the great 
inventors of all time, which can be seen in the foyer of the 
main entrance to the main site of Bell Laboratories (one of 
the great labs of all time), along with a bust of Bell himself: 
Leave the beaten track occasionally and dive into the woods. 
You will be certain to find something that you have never seen 
before. 
... Finally, to go out in the fields: teach, cany out research 
and do outreach activities ... 
After I was appointed here at Wageningen University & 
Research and began the necessary preparations for the de-
livery of my inaugural address, I decided to familiarize my-
self with the history of Wageningen University and the 
broader Food Valley (or even better: Food Family), in 
which it is embedded. In my new position, I tap into inno-
vation and entrepreneurship, a field I am familiar with due 
to my RSM Erasmus University appointment, but I did not 
think that I would start investigating anything before fa-
miliarizing myself with the area of new venture creation 
and growth, namely, the privatization, liberalization and 
governance issues in public utilities and services provision. 
Almost ten years ago I defended my PhD thesis at Erasmus 
University, in which I compared the restructuring process-
es in the Dutch, French and British telecommunications in-
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dustry, and the political and corporate strategies involved in 
the implementation of privatization, liberalization and reg-
ulation (Hulsink. 1996). Later I investigated how competi-
tion was created in formerly monopolistic markets and the 
shifting public and private involvement in shaping tomor-
row's infrastructures (e.g. Hulsink, 1999; Wubben & 
Hulsink, 2003; Hulsink, 2005). At more or less the same 
time, I worked together with several colleagues at SPRU 
University of Sussex in preparing a project proposal to look 
into the governance of British government laboratories and 
their changing roles in the field of science and technology 
(Martin, Hawkins, Berkhout, Hulsink & Molas-Gallart, 
1997), a project that was never realized. Having looked in 
the recent history of Wageningen UR and one of its sub-
sidiaries, the DLO Foundation, I am curious to find out 
how the decision-making process regarding the more or less 
secret privatization of DLO took place and how it eventu-
ally remained within the public sphere (as part of 
Wageningen UR). Also, I want to look into how it was that 
a clear bias towards extension and safeguarding the vertical 
and integrated chain approach to innovation in the agri-
business emerged and manifested itself, and how alternative 
knowledge transfer mechanisms (e.g. through patenting, li-
censing and spin-off creation) were not even considered. 
One of my goals for the next three years is to try and bring 
the dispersed group of entrepreneurship teachers, researchers 
and practitioners at Wageningen closer together. It took my 
close colleague Hans Dons and me over a year to find out that 
there is a potentially strong community, covering the areas of 
innovation, new venture creation, knowledge transfer and 
firm growth, with colleagues from various disciplines with dif-
ferent affiliations, backgrounds and orientations, varying 
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from the normative and prescriptive to the analytical and clin-
ical. Initially, we got the feeling that the two us, working at the 
Management Studies group of the Social Sciences depart-
ment, were two lone riders trying to find their way in the 
Wageningen labyrinth, but then we heard about the teaching, 
research, and outreach (extension and knowledge transfer) 
programme of Wageningen Business School, the Students' 
Entrepreneurship Centre (STOC), the Biopartner Centre 
Incubator, Wageningen Business Generator, the entrepre-
neurship/small business nucleus at the Agricultural 
Economics Research Institute (LEI), and the education/com-
petencies group in our Social Sciences department. 
A positive outcome of this search was that it turned out that 
the number of people at Wageningen UR who are interest-
ed in and committed to entrepreneurship (both full-time 
and part-time) is much bigger than we initially expected, 
almost 20 professionals in all. Unfortunately, it also became 
clear that the majority of these people did not know each 
other, making it not only embarrassing for all of us but al-
so for external stakeholders, who may ultimately become 
frustrated or lost, unable to find the professional or func-
tion they are looking for at Wageningen UR. We realized 
that we had our work cut out in trying to bring all these 
people together and providing an overview of all our/their 
activities in the field of entrepreneurship (i.e. awareness, ed-
ucation, experience and business creation), and finding out 
whether we and our outside stakeholders can benefit from 
the coordination and collaboration in all our efforts. The 
overall objective of this mobilization effort is to help make 
Wageningen the 'place to be' when it comes to innovation 
and entrepreneurship in the agro-food business. 
Hopefully I will soon get to know the gems among the 
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group of entrepreneurs based in the larger Wageningen set-
ting. I have already met several highly motivated opportu-
nity seekers, business builders and recognized entrepre-
neurs, and invited them to my classes to tell the younger 
generation about their initial expectations and venturing 
experiences, providing an opportunity for students and as-
piring entrepreneurs to meet the founders and builders of, 
and investors in new and growing businesses. This is espe-
cially useful for those who do not really know or have 
worked with any entrepreneur first hand, and who are now 
given the opportunity to find out what it is all about. 
Students that grew up in a family business already know 
what small business ownership and entrepreneurship en-
tails, and they are already familiar with the pros and cons. 
They have learned by watching and experiencing venturing 
activities and, as a consequence, are more susceptible to the 
idea of becoming self-employed than students whose par-
ents are not self-employed; in this respect, Shane (2003: 
86-89) uses the concept of 'vicarious learning' to refer to 
the fact that people whose parents are self-employed are 
more likely to become entrepreneurs themselves. 
Since setting up a venture by oneself after finishing the spe-
cialized Life-sciences, Innovation & Management programme 
or the Masterclass Biobusiness, and perhaps after gaining a 
certain amount of business experience, has become a career 
alternative, students and aspiring entrepreneurs may bene-
fit from observing and interacting with true entrepreneurs. 
According to Harvard University and Babson College 
Professor Timmons (1989: 9), a good example is the most 
powerful teacher: 'Seeing what has and can be done points 
the way cleanly and simply, and plants the seed of what is 
possible. There is a connection between the presence of role 
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models and the emergence of entrepreneurs that dispels the 
notion of entrepreneurs being 'born, not made". It would 
be very rewarding indeed if the entrepreneurs that are lo-
cated in Food Valley were to become visible through edu-
cational, business and regional activities and if the popula-
tion of emerging and actual entrepreneurs were to grow 
substantially over the years. 
While there always be people to whom the idea of becom-
ing an entrepreneur does not appeal, fortunately there are 
still plenty of men and women who are attempting to be-
come entrepreneurs or who are already entrepreneurs. One 
of the things I want to do in the near future is to take a clos-
er look at this pool of (nascent) entrepreneurs in the larger 
Wageningen setting and study their venturing activities 
closely, and find out whether there are any substantial dif-
ferences between 'potential', 'nascent' and 'actual' entrepre-
neurship in the East Netherlands, as well as the other re-
gions in our country. This plan could lead to a Regional 
Entrepreneurship Monitor that would allow us to compare 
the results to any of the regional, Dutch or Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor publications (EIM, 2005a; 
GEM Consortium, 2005). Leaving the findings of such a 
future project aside, additional policy measures may be nec-
essary to raise not only the number of new as well as high-
growth businesses (EIM, 2005b), but also to improve the 
quality of those techno-starters and bring their ambitions 
to a higher level. 
This research project is motivated not only by curiosity and 
a genuine interest in what entrepreneurs do and who they 
are (or want to become) and what they have to rely upon 
when establishing and launching their venture, but also by 
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a desire to put these successful entrepreneurs together in a 
directory of 'local heroes', the way Scottish Enterprise 
(1995, 1997) has done, and similar to what Beveridge 
(2001) has done in a booklet on Cambridge entrepreneurs. 
In the case of Scotland, considerable effort was made by 
Scottish Enterprise to increase coverage of entrepreneurship 
in the media: for that purpose case studies were written and 
provided to journalists, and published in a directory of suc-
cessful entrepreneurs called 'Local Heroes'. We need a 
change in attitudes toward self-employment and new ven-
ture creation, and a more positive coverage of entrepre-
neurship in the local and regional media as well as the edu-
cation system, with a clear emphasis on entrepreneurial role 
models, may help make Food Valley a better place to nur-
ture and support entrepreneurs. We should make heroes of 
local entrepreneurs such as Harry Otten and Lucas Noldus. 
To cut a long story short, we need to increase awareness 
about self-employment and new venture creation as alter-
native career paths, in addition to the traditional opportu-
nities offered by universities, government and businesses; 
even people in their fifties and sixties, who are not planning 
to retire or who are not interested in an early retirement 
scheme or lay-off package, may be interested. 
... A special thanks ... 
A special thanks goes out, first of all, to my principals at 
Wageningen UR. To begin with, I want to thank our new 
Vice-chancellor Martin Kropff for officially endorsing my 
chair in innovative entrepreneurship. Having heard his sug-
gestion to promote entrepreneurship as a new part of a re-
vised OVO/REE-triptych, I am confident that he will ac-
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tively support the promotion of entrepreneurship. Secondly, 
I want to thank former Vice-chancellor Bert Speelman for 
his involvement, behind the scenes at Wageningen UR and 
the Wageningen University Endowment, in pushing for this 
professorial chair and hence making todays event possible. I 
will never forget meeting the then Vice-chancellor for the 
first time and ending up talking to him in our common 
Saxon dialect. I felt immediately at ease in the holiest of 
holies at Wageningen UR 
Next, I would like to thank the Wageningen University 
Endowment (WUF) for financing my chair and helping to 
make yesterday and today's 'high-tech valleys and research 
triangles' conference possible, here at Wageningen UR. To 
their credit, they were the first to set money aside to create 
the first chair at Wageningen UR for a professor in innova-
tive entrepreneurship. As early as 1998, they asked Tom 
Elfring, who was at the time a colleague of mine at Erasmus 
University, to take up that position. Today I feel proud that 
I am able to follow in the footsteps of a man who has al-
ways been a trusted colleague, inspiring collaborator and 
close friend. Another person who I want to thank for mak-
ing the chair and today's event possible, is Onno Omta, 
chairman of the Management Studies group, the unit to 
which I am affiliated. I know that publicly and behind the 
scenes he has played an active and daring role, in ensuring 
that the professenial chair would be maintained and new 
candidates could apply after my predecessor had left to take 
up a full time position elsewhere. Also I want to thank Paul 
van Beek, deputy chairman of the Management Studies 
group for having helped me out at a critical stage in the ap-
plication and hiring process and Vinus Zachariasse, Dean 
of the Social Sciences group, for having facilitated a satis-
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factory temporary solution for the office space problems 
colleague Hans Dons and I faced at the time. I am glad that 
neither Paul van Beek nor Vinus Zachariasse need to be in-
volved any longer, now that I have been officially appoint-
ed for some time and the new and fully refurbished 
Leeuwenborch building offers us a decent space. 
Another person I want to thank for making today possible 
is my RSM Erasmus University Dean, Han van Dissel. 
When I told him about the possibility of a part-time ap-
pointment at Wageningen University, he supported it and 
actively looked for ways to make it possible. Talking of my 
other university, I want to thank my eShip colleagues 
Wynand, Orietta, Erik and Dick for all the good times we 
had in carrying out our joint research and teaching activi-
ties. I trust new challenges await us beyond the horizon. 
It has been a real pleasure working with my colleague Hans 
Dons for the last eighteen months. I feel that as a team we 
complement each other perfectly, and I value his seniority, 
business experience and insider's knowledge of the 
Wageningen research and the Dutch life sciences settings. I 
look forward to working together with him, trying to bring 
the entrepreneurship crowd at Wageningen together and 
taking a closer look at the evolution of the DLO 
Foundation and its strengths and weaknesses over all the 
years. Also I want to mention Wietze van der Aa, the 
Director of Wageningen Business School, for his helping 
hand in introducing me to my new working environment, 
and I also want to thank him for getting me on board at the 
Bio-Business Masterclass almost two years ago, and for his 
active involvement in (re-)designing and organizing this 
programme for life-sciences entrepreneurs. 
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Talking about our new beautiful Social Science department 
building, I am especially looking forward to working to-
gether with my close colleagues in the Management Studies 
group, with Martin Mulder and Thomas Lans on entrepre-
neurial competences, Wim Heijman on entrepreneurship 
and regional development, Hielke van der Meulen on local 
food production systems, and the LEI nucleus on entrepre-
neurship and small business. Also, I am looking forward to 
exploring future exchanges with all those Leeuwenborch 
colleagues I met briefly or simply in passing: there are plen-
ty of interesting opportunities ahead of us to exploit. 
Next, I want to thank the students for being here and, of 
course, for showing up in our classes, but especially for be-
ing curious about what it means to be an entrepreneur and 
for being enthusiastic about the prospect of starting and 
growing a new business. It is good to know that a growing 
number of Wageningen UR students are interested in find-
ing out what entrepreneurship is all about and translating 
their enthusiasm in the way they organize all kinds of in-
teresting events. When people talk about further integrat-
ing the beta-science and the alpha/gamma-social sciences 
programmes, you should know that most of you, especially 
those of you specializing in Life sciences Innovation 
Management (LIM), are the perfect illustration of that 
promising new combination. 
In addition to being involved in education and research in 
the field of entrepreneurship and management, like at RSM 
Erasmus University, at Wageningen I am also close to poli-
cy development and implementation, and find myself in a 
position to work with entrepreneurs, intrapreneurs and 
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their facilitators, all of whom are involved together in set-
ting up new businesses, and I have an opportunity to help 
them grow. These 'partners in crime', or more appropriate 
fellow entrepreneurship evangelists, include: 
- Wim Jongen and his colleagues at the Wageningen 
Business Generator; 
- Jeff Gielen at the incubator Biopartner Centre 
Wageningen; 
- Roger van Hoesel and Charles Crombach at Food 
Valley. 
I would also like to thank a small number of people and or-
ganizations who were actively involved in preparing our 
conference 'High-tech valleys & research triangles in the 
East Netherlands and elsewhere': namely Paul den Besten, 
Monique Montenarie, Gert Stronkhorst, and our sponsors 
Oost NV, Rabobank, Wageningen University Endowment 
(WUF) and PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
Dan stap ik nu over in mijn moedertaal het Nederlands, 
daar ik een speciaal woord van dank voor mijn ouders en 
familie in petto heb. Mijn kennis van de biologie gaat niet 
ver, maar ik weet wel dat ik zonder jullie hier niet had ges-
taan: dat geldt zowel voor mijn geboorte als mijn vroege en 
late groei. Dat hebben jullie allemaal mogelijk gemaakt. Ik 
ben mijn verhaal begonnen met te vertellen hoe, ook al heb 
ik het boerenbedrijf verlaten, datzelfde boerenbedrijf mij 
toch niet meer loslaat, en op een andere manier dan 
voorzien. Het lijkt met andere woorden in mijn gen of 
DNA te zitten dat ik via een grote boog nu toch uitein-
delijk zelf aan het boeren ben geslagen, weliswaar met ken-
nis en met kennissen in de IJVER (IJssel-Vecht Rijn) delta, 
iets anders dan jullie deden met de koeien, maar toch. 
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Misschien is het beter zo, alhoewel ik onze John Deere toch 
wel af en toe mis.... 
Ik heb gezegd 
... Notes ... 
The contribution of Wageningen University scientists (among others, 
Professor A. Blaauw, E. van Slogteren and M.P. de Bruyn Ouboter) 
included further research into flower bulb cultivation and virus dis-
ease discovery, and development and renewal of the range of tulip 
variation, for instance by making them bloom as early as possible (as 
every tourist can witness when they visit the Keukenhof Lisse around 
Easter (van Maanen 1993: 1-13; Wageningen Tulip Portal hrrp://li-
brary.wur.nl/tulipl. Three entrepreneurial firms were also involved in 
the early international success of Dutch tulips, namely E. H. Krelage 
& Sons, Zocher & Co, and C. G. van Tubergen. 
The so-called 'land-grant' universities in the U.S. (granted on the basis 
of the federal 1862 Morrill Land Grant Act), for instance the 
University of Wisconsin, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) were the first to align themselves with daily life and socio-eco-
nomic development (Kerr, 1995). The overall aim of their 'land grant' 
activities was to assist agricultural and industrial development 
through opening their doors to the children of workers and farmers, 
as well as the upper and middle classes, and developing agricultural 
and urban extension through additional training and research related 
to the technical advance of farming and manufacturing. 
' Of course in terms of its size and specialized focus, Wageningen UR is 
definitely not on a par with, for instance, the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, one of the world's leading science and engineering 
schools. Wageningen UR, however, has a couple of things in common 
with the American research universities (Roberts, 1991; Kerr, 1995). 
54 
First of all, both Wageningen UR and the American research univer-
sities have been recognized as important actors in technological 
change and economic development in their respective domains and as 
a source of basic knowledge, technical solutions and skilled labour 
have made their overall contributions to Dutch and American socie-
ty. Secondly, both Wageningen UR and the U.S. research universities, 
initially strongly relied upon services proceeds from extension activi-
ties (approximately 1880-1970), subsequendy followed by federal or 
national/European research grants and private funds from industry 
(approximately 1950 till today), and donations from alumni (where-
as this is already common practice in the U.S., in Wageningen this has 
yet to be developed). 
* The term farming in the sense described above is also used in the area of 
biotechnology (as molecular farming or pharming), where it refers to 
the use of plants or other living organisms as factories for biological 
and chemical products, with the objective of producing not foodstuffs 
but pharmaceuticals (references). Another application of farming out-
side agriculture and the life sciences is in the field of artificial intelli-
gence and datamining; here it is an inexpensive method for building 
systems incorporating montecarlo simulations, qualitative reasoning, 
machine learning and randomized abductive logic (see for instance 
the work of computer and artifical intelligence specialist Dr. Tim 
Menzies, http://menzies.us). 
' In 1981, after a successful career at Intel, Campbell went to find his for-
tune elsewhere and set up SEEQ, a company that developed memo-
ry and communications chips, which was listed at the Nasdaq two 
years later. In 1985, he again moved on and established Chips and 
Technologies, which also went public and was listed at the Nasdaq 
within two years. After these two successful start-ups, he decided he 
wanted to be more involved with and bring together new technolo-
gies, new companies, new teams and new ideas in new entities, and to 
that end he established Techfarm ventures (www.techfarming.com). 
In the late 1990s, this approach was copied and put to the extreme by 
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the Icarus of the speech and language technology industry, L&H (De 
Witte, Van Aelst & Van Peteghem (2001) and Joris (2005)). 
" For a first introduction to real options reasoning, see Adner & Levinthal 
(2004a, b) and McGrath, Ferrier & Mendelow (2004). 
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